Group Think and Risky Shift
The judgments and decision processes of people in groups often differ from how they make up their minds when acting alone. The notions of 'group-think' and 'risky shift refers to two observed processes of group dynamics.
When we work together in groups we sometimes suffer illusions of righteousness and invincibility. Irving Janis in his book "Victims of Group-Think" described his observations of a phenomena of group leadership and member interaction characterised by inward-looking, self-regulating and stereotypical behaviours that lead to distorted decision-making. Janis defines GROUPTHINK as
"a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action."
Two further phenomena, "risky shift" and "cautious shift" and may also be seen.
- With Risky shift , the decision group becomes more radical and willing to take a risk. The decision makes as a group gamble more than an individual often would when making the same decision.
- With Cautious shift - the group shifts to being more conservative than solo individuals would usually be.
GroupThink
Risky/Cautious Shift
Symptoms of "defective decision making" in executive groups associated with problems and mistakes in policy decisions include:
- the group fails to explore alternatives. Maybe one idea only is focused on with scant attention to other ideas. Rejected alternatives are seldom re-examined and go unheeded.
- the group fails to consider all available objectives. The best may not be chosen.
- insufficient exploration of costs and risks of options. Assumptions are made and negative outcomes too readily discounted or overlooked.
- Information searches are superficial. All possible data for the decision area is not gathered. There is also selective/biased filtering and communicating of results to others. The group tends to exclude valuable items of information which "do not fit their picture".
- the "groupthink" group fails to work out the detail of implementation, monitoring, and contingency plan and worst case scenarios etc. They overassume what is or is not possible. Consequences and risks are ignored or glossed over.
Run your eyes down this list - these features commonly occur in group decision-making. What is new - people are people and are fallible? Many of the above often do not lead to problems however the argument focuses on those times (critical situations) when the pervasive and unhelpful dynamics of "groupthink" lead to unsound decisions with undesirable consequences and fiascoes resulting (the new Mercedes Benz - A class car which at 40 mph rolls over during the "elk" test).
Symptoms of Groupthink
Janis describes eight symptoms - the undesirable aspects of the "group-think" phenomena as it affects group performance in its decision-making.
Illusion of Vulnerability.
Members of the group develop an impression that they can do no wrong which may happen when the group is powerful. "Our approach and organisation are sound. We are confident and enjoy a good reputation. If we all work together we can't go wrong". They feel invincible.To avoid this Janis recommends that members should systematically play devil's advocate to explore all perspectives, possibilities and flaws before putting plans into action.
Stereotyping Outsiders
A group exhibiting groupthink will more frequently and dangerously rely on shared stereotypes to justify their needs and positions. They may stereotype members of the group itself - they more readily stereotype rivals, enemies, other departments and even expert advisers who slow down or challenge their decision-making tasks.We all have our own stereotypes and categorisations of people and situations. Unfortunately stereotypes too frequently are inaccurate and misleading. In discussions members readily assume and share fixed, stereotypical attitudes to specific situations or people. In a pharmaceutical company, for example, a doctor's meticulousness in the conduct of product trials may be regarded by go-getting, results-oriented group members as overly fussy. When combined with the illusion of invulernability - an outsider's views (even though expert) may be discount and even discredited in conversation. If the expert (a minority of one) fits a stereotype and sport can be made of this by powerful members of the group then the group as a whole may confirm an opinion that - say - "fussiness" is a negative behaviour which in their view - contributes to a wrong judgment. The outsider's view can be put down.
Stereotypes place things in neat categories which we reference to predict events - how others may react etc. Categories have value in analysis but they may partial and not factual. Their use can lead to pre-mature, erroneous conclusions. decisions referenced by inaccurate stereotypes are founded on misconceptions and selective, distorted information.
Bounded rationality and tethered assumptions
Group tend to suffer from their own bounded rationality. Members fall under the impression that they are right - even if data/evidence suggests they may be wrong. Members reassure others that their interpretation and perspective on matters is correct. We even believe in our own righteousness (see illusion of morality).The danger however is that the "right", ignore what they don't know or don't want to know. They come to believe what want to believe without challenging old assumptions. A marketing group wants its new product to succeed. They readily convince themselves that it will (Ford - Probe, Mercedes A Class runabout, thalidomide, Westland helicopter, Concorde, open goods trains with lattice sides on the Channel tunnel).
A form of "inverted intelligence" may be evident e.g.
"the actual information we have doesn't quite fit what we want to do but we know our customers and what they want". The information must be wrong. The worst will never happen anyway. being moral people we wouldn't let this happen - would we? We have everyone's best interests at heart. If we communicate and present our message properly people will come to understand. ".
There may be a willingness to do something, accept any answer, however poor rather than no action or answer at all.
Janis recommends that avoidance of the bounded rationality problem requires listening and careful scrutiny of evidence and alternative. If some evidence points in the wrong direction then GO OUT and get more. DO NOT act until the situation can be confirmed. Challenge tethered assumptions.
Belief in Inherent Morality
This is an extension to the invulnerability and righteousness symptoms. Janis feels this can occur when the group as a whole- feels they are doing the right thing and
- believe their cause to be morally underpinned. They exhibit an illusion of morality.
A group may see that
- they direct a successful company (or government) with a good reputation.
- They cooperate well with each other and/or have a powerful leader who gives energy to the group.
- The feeling is that "we are good guys and our decisions are in everyone's best interests. We are doing this to benefit everyone."
- The situation may be one where radical reform of policies or organisation is being confronted.
"Hard choices have to be made and it is inevitable that some people will get hurt. It is a jungle out there. We have the best intentions and are not seeing to hurt anyone - indeed quite the contrary."
Janis recommends caution and sensitivity to the potential that the illusion of morality has to distort decision-making. Individuals and minorities may be hurt unnecessarily.
Members need to constantly reappraise the "rightness" of their cause. The statement that there is no alternative or that the consequences inevitable need to be challenged. There are always other alternatives with different consequences.
From an ethical perspective - the notion of moral invulnerability - may apply a dogmatic, doctrinal perspective on others who - without being able to make the choice for themselves - may suffer substantial consequences.
Self-Censorship.
In a groupthink situation, one characteristic is that members may submit themselves to self censorship. Conformity comes into play.A group member may raise questions and objections about the group's activities but on meeting a rebuff (opposition often from the leader or the leader's supporters) withdraw and not press the point home. Their attempt to open up discussion is too thin and insubstantial to make a difference to a fierce argument.
The person on their own - a minority of one - sticks out like a sore thumb. It is uncomfortable and can be personality humiliating and stressful. If everyone else in the group is against you - the easiest approach is to "put up and shut up". We openly voice objections in discussion where everyone is generally in agreement. Where objection is not generally shared it is easy to go along with group opinion and then carp about the group's decision afterwards to friends.
Yet from a decision-making perspective - if you know something is wrong - it is important to say it and keep on saying it. The problem is when this becomes a nuisance (the same tired old message?) to dominant others. The loner becomes excluded and stereotyped.
This symptom may be evident where group leaders express the view that a consensus prevails. Everyone has had the opportunity to expressed their views - haven't they? Such a overhead, summary remark from predominant members of the group may actually add to the possibility of a dissenter not voicing valid objections in case they (or you) are accused of rocking the boat, raking over old group again or are rejected by an arbitrary guillotine being applied.
Janis uses the anecdote of John F. Kennedy agreeing to the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba (subsequently a massive failure/fiasco). Kennedy secured Schlesinger's concurrence but Schlesinger later (post-hoc rationalisation?) stated that he had doubts at the time which he regretted not expressing.
Exercise
Read Cornelius Ryan's book, A Bridge too Far, and evaluate the pre-campaign intelligence information available to the 1944 commanders of the allied forces.
Direct Pressure on Dissenters
Sometimes a group member who questions the rightness of the goals is pressurised by others into concurring/agreeing. Others may button-hole (lobby) or even seek to discredit a dissenting member.A group leader or prominent group member may use power statements such as
"I'm sure that Sunil isn't trying to upset the apple cart". Lobbyists may urge possible dissenters not to press their case too hard as the "Director - is keen on this one going through and would not take kindly to being contradicted" or "Just go along with it, we will be able to make concessions and fine tune the detail later".
Such behaviours lead to uncritical thinking, acquiescence and conformity in decisions. The expertise that members have to offer is not used effectively.
Mindguards
A characteristic of group think behaviour, Janis suggests, is that a member of the group might take it upon themselves to shield the leader from dissenters/doubters. The "protector" To avoid this, make sure that all of the group members know that the leader is open to criticism. Mind-guarding - you try to avoid expressing an unpopular view. This is akin to self-censorship. Silence contributes an illusion of unanimity. Some of the group members might have a private opinion about the goals of the group but, again, no one wants to speak up.
Avoiding the worst of Groupthink
To confirm these symptoms as, "observable and repeated behaviours", Janis interprets a cases - many political and military - which offer ancedotal evidence of inadequate decisions and their consequences. He offers recommendations to avoid bad group decisions.
- Appoint group members to roles which evaluate group processes and contributions of other members;
- in discussion, focus fully on areas of doubt and uncertainty - be tenacious in challenging tethered assumptions and presenting the fullest possible information. Challenge the data - assess its significance and reliability.
- group leaders need to solicit and receive feedback/criticism from others re- his/her judgments. This feedback and examination process needs to seen as a contributor to quality and not a gripe or complaint mechanism. The potential for holding grudges and punishment of "critics" must be avoided d.
- help the group to take regular time-out breaks to give individuals room to re-think, re-formulate, gather further data and re-present. Sub-groups can do more detailed work for re-presentation. Group cohesion as a problem-analysis and solution development unit is assisted as difficult tasks are decomposed and alternatives properly synthesised.
Risky Shift (Stoner 1961 reported in Cartwright and Zander)
Risky shift or cautious shift behaviours in a group may undermine good decision making and group members need to be sensitive to such processes and their implications.We normally think that committee decisions are usually slow and cautious where think that bland consensus compromises result yet we be frustrated by slow, rule bound, bureaucratic processes involved. However committees can often be bolder and more adventurous decisions than single members acting alone. Why?
- sme risk takers are more powerful and persuasive in a group situation
- member responsibility is diffused as there is a degree of anonymity (a corporate veil) in the group. The group is responsible for decisions and risky decisions carry less of a burden for individuals.
- the converse also applies, a group can be overly cautious.
- a group can polarise into cautious and risk-taking opposites.
- As with groupthink, the group may not rationally and systematically process decisions based on full information and all member views.
Group behaviour research into 'choice shifts or group polarisation' offers more insight into some of group processes which may be enacted. Stoner's work (in Cartwright and Zander 1964) indicated that in deciding between dilemmas involving different levels of risk, groups assumed riskier positions than individuals prior to joining the group. When reaching consensus "the group" did not average individual judgments but 'shifted' to greater risk but not always. Sometimes there was no shift or sometimes the group demonstrated greater caution.
Why might choice shifts or polarisation occur? Wallach, Kogan & Bem suggest three group dynamics effects.
- Averaging, group decisions cluster around the average of individual decisions derived from prior discussion.
- Increased conservatism, group discussion may inhibit the boldness and risk taking of individuals.
- Increased risk taking, it may lead to more radical, bold conclusions and decisions.
When, in a group, individuals make social comparisons and adjust prior positions relative to the group majority view.
- in group discussion, information and arguments may favour a 'majority view'. The individual is exposed and, conforming, may shift to the emerging polar position of the majority.
- Individuals face a choice of being members (in) or marginalised (out). To be accepted they need to anticipate the group's perspective and this may move them further towards 'the norm' and the group average leans to more to the extreme or polarised position.
- in a group social diffusion of responsibility may be evident - those who are less dominant may not press their point of view as they are able to hide behind 'cabinet responsibility'.
Social Diffusion of Responsibility
The anecdote of a woman who in 1964 was murdered just outside her New York home is often told to illustrate the cautious and risky shift phenomena. The fought the murderer off but the latter returned and attacked her again over a 30 minute period. She screamed for help but responded or called the police even though her cries were heard by many. Did everyone assume that someone else was taking action? The burden of responsibility was diffused ..... by the assumption that "somebody was doing something about the screams ".Social diffusion of responsibility reflects a belief that the presence of other people in a situation makes one less personally responsible for the events that occur in that situation.
In terms of risky shift, the individual is less included to challenge the tethered assumptions of the majority position - but instead may find it more comfortable to hide within a 'majority' view. Thus the 'risky shift' or 'cautious shift' group decision may prevail. The individual - post decision - can always state in private, 'Well, I really felt that too big a risk was being taken, but everyone wanted to move in that direction'.
Further Reading
Written by Chris Jarvis for the BOLA project