Mackie declares his relativist, indeterminate view of Aristotle's "What is the good life for man?"
"The good life will be such as to satisfy the interests in question...of those who participate in the good life...(for) .....any specific activities, the interests both of those who engage in them and those who are affected by them - but also ours: what we call the good life must be one that we can welcome and approve."
The question is hard to resolve
Mackie nonetheless explores the generalities and rehearses ideas and arguments that stem from from many sources. He argues
"any individual's good life (is) made up largely of the effective pursuit of activities that he finds worthwhile, either intrinsically, or because they are directly beneficial to others about whom he cares, or because he knows them to be instrumental in providing the means of wellbeing for himself and those closely connected with him."
"I am a reasonably benevolent person, I want happiness and contentment. Fly me to the moon and let me sit amongst the stars."
Much contentment is linked with those we care about/identify with. It is a synergy - more than a sum of individual enjoyments. Thus I might say - "I had a good...life... it had its ups and downs but....."
One function of "morality" perhaps is to mediate and constrain narrow selfish interests. Mackie feels that all individuals can expect and reasonably hope for is a general "Good life" with self-referential altruism (Hume's confined generosity). There is nothing wrong with self-love although excess or absence of it can be damaging.
We develop (pluralism) ways of institutionalising and regulating cooperation, competition, and conflict between rival social and political ideals. On this basis Mackie argues that
He references Fitzjames Stephen's view
"Love your neighbour in proportion to the degree in which he approaches yourself and appeals to your passions and sympathies. In hating your enemy, bear in mind ...that under excitment you are likely to hate him more than you would wish to do upon a deliberate consideration of all his relations to yourself and your friends, and of your permanent and remote as compared with your immediate interest".
Fitzjames Stephen contrasts
with
As distinctive, independent individuals we inherit biology, upbringing, historical and social traditions /values - part of the good life's baggage. Nevertheless forms of co-operation and competition and conflict must be managed in our groups - within families, supplier networks, between employers and employees and between states. These of course may overlap and provide dilemmas of loyalty.