MBS315 Mackie
2. Egoism, rights, and property

Concepts of egoism and self-referential altruism describe kinds of activity and motivation. They act as moral principles if

"we want people to see it as not only legitimate but right and proper that they should pursue what they see as their own well-being."

There is a plausible prima facie case for each person adopting principles that

"conventionally belong with whatever relationships he finds himself in, or enters more or less voluntarily, and in which he hopes to remain."

Thus ideas about rights, for individuals and of groups, are vital to the "good life" goal. To say you have a "right" involves referencing some legal or moral system (internalised or external). with two "rights" going together.

• a liberty and
• a claim-right.

At liberty to act
If I say that I am free to do something - then I believe that I am not prevented or forbidden to act by "the system" which indeed may actually give permission via its regulations and practices.

A claim-right
Asserting a "claim right" may mean that if I or a representative (e.g. parent or campaigner) claim a right to X or not to do X, the system will recognise the claim and give support in obtaining it. It may require others to fulfil their duty to me e.g. pay their debts, compensate me. Freedom to act also implies that others cannot stop me (a claim-right). The egotistical aim for a good life requires me to have room in which to choose how I can achieve the aim.

Systems of rights serve communities well and work to secure freedoms for individuals/groups. So plausibly, some rights are needed - albeit difficult to specify with itsy-bitsy detail.

Consider the problem of right to privacy and regulation of media intrusion into personal life.

Mackie rejects arguments suggesting that

• we can define specific, a priori rights (rejected on the grounds of generality).
• or that rights when defined can be so absolute as to fit every possible situation

Definition requires hooking into an ideal or socially legitimised system of rights or both but in practice rights may result from negotiated compromises - again an outcome of power play or a politico-legal process. Alternatively they may be arbitarily and immorally asserted (coercive power) or applied by self-interest groups to maintain their own position.

Consider the business notions of being "in restraint of trade" or monopolistic practices being impermissable for a free market.

Discuss your view on whether or not such concepts have tended to limit or enhance business freedoms/opportunities and the scope for more people to appreciate the "good life".

Property ownership

This is a particular case of rights - a melange central to business and private enterprise, inheritence and nationalism etc. Mackie criticises Locke's (and more recently Nozick's) a priori notions of ownership of property rights.

Locke argues for a natural law of property independent of legislation or subjective morality. His is a general case for someone legitimately acquiring and keeping a property and thereafter having rights to transfer, exchange or bequeath to others. Was Robin Hood unjust in robbing the rich and giving to the poor?

Locke's labour theory of property rights proposes that we all have exclusive right to our own person and labour. Each (and with qualifications) shares in natures abundance - available to all to enjoy and apply our best efforts to.

If I pick nuts from a forest (mix labour with apples) or fill a wagon with salt from a salt lake (James Stewart in The Man from Laramie) , or clear/cultivate some land - then the value obtained stems from

• the labour
• abundant, natural resources, there at the start

Locke argues that such natural resources are common property. There is enough for all provided that taking some does not effectively diminish the whole. If I mix my labour with the natural resource - the part that I take I come to own.

"The salt in the wagon is mine. I've laboured all day to shovel it up. Taking it from me is theft."

"This jug of water is mine, I obtained, shaped and fired the clay. I went down to the river and filled the jug. There is plenty more good water for you - so you go and get it yourself. "

The value stems from the effort put into transforming part of an abundance in to something more specific and valuable.

Damming or diverting a river for entirely my own purposes to the detriment of those downstream - is a different matter however. The Locke requirement is abundance and taking without depriving others. This is fine for pioneers on voyages of discovery to unoccupied lands (save for a few primitives - who can be pushed onto reservations!). But (Nozick) can such conditions today be satisfied in the face of scarcity and nationalist territoriality? Resources are exhaustible. Competition over them is evident. We pass Lisa's bucket to Locke.

Even where acquisition/ownership was "legitimate" in times past (the qualifications were met), can we assume a lasting right to such property? Exclusive retention rights for things legitimately acquired in the year MDCCIX - may now be challenged. The cases range from nationalisation to the Common Fisheries policy of the EU and on to worker rights.

For Mackie, the labour theory of property rights side-steps the scarce resources problem. In modern economies most production directly or indirectly involves

• the work of many
• techniques, skills and knowledge provided by many others
• goods may have value added but because of changes in circumstances and not labour e.g. someone produces complementary goods (oil increases in demand and price because someone invents the internal combusion engine).
• the value of property or an inheritence - can increase because of community stability and/or improvement to infrastructures organised and funded by the state from taxation. Equally values may also fall in a market.

Inheritence

Rights to bequeath/inherit property are are not self-evident from abstracted, first principle. They are useful devices on the merits of cases but there are other issues. Property rights arising from adding value by toiling with a freely abundant resource - is only one factor. We add specifics by defining what "owners"can or cannot do with various properties/things they own.

Examine the case for patent and copyright

It is unsatisfactory to conclude that there can be no rights to property (or say private property). Such "rights" evolve in a community over time. Mackie, arguing from legitimate egoism and self-referential altruism, sees that some such rights contribute to securing the good life and free pursuit of happiness. He rejects cruder, unitary notions of utilitarianism arguing that

• happiness (the good for man), is not a single, undifferentiated thing which a central, powerful, intelligent, trust-worthy authority - consistently well-disposed to all - can plan to provide for all
• this is associated also with common, collective ownership of all property (benign happiness, sharing and communal values).

Instead he links "the good for man" with competitive pursuit of diverse ideals and private goals. Separate property ownership enables this. Individual (or group) rights and private property may be obstacles to collective, unitary ideals but to deny the need for some rights in this area is to fly in the face of the natural and "irresolvably diverse" goals of individuals.

So no natural law of property but a case is made for some law of property.

Nationalism

• Do national, territorial rights cover the limiting or forbidding of immigration, or denial of citizenship to immigrants or even locally born children of immigrants?

• What counts as the same nation over time ? Yugoslavia, Spain, the United Kingdom? How do we resolve the problem of disputed territories - areas and regions occupied by groups who desire independent nation-hood - Palestine, Northern Ireland, the German Sudetenland, the Basque country, Scunthorpe.

Iceland is a simple case - one national group - but many nationalistic groups are in conflict over territorial claim-rights. Each side appeals to their "absolute rights". Polarised, uncompromising positions are taken up. There is no surrender. We wear blue they, the enemy, wear grey. Atrocities and losses of innocent lives are legitimised. The other side are labelled terrorists in a situation defined as civil unrest rather than war.

Mackie suggests that "it is almost.. unhelpful to ask what solution will maximise total utility in the area, or happiness summed over all...concerned." Conflicting groups cannot accept compromise. Carving up the territory on the basis of military gains and strengths does not foster long term stability which only results if the parties

• acknowledge "reality" and consequences if the conflict and damage persists.
• recognise their conflicting prima facie rights as such and seek a reasoned, politically and morally defensible compromise before a "court of international opinion" (using recognised, reliable, non-controversial principles).