A consequence of making agreements is that most solemn agreements are forged between parties whose relationship offers more potential for conflict than natural co-operation. Mackie quotes both Machiavelli and Hume
Machiavelli
"a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe
all those things which are considered good in men,
being often obliged, in order to maintain the state,
to act against faith, against charity, against humanity,
and against religion", and that "a prudent ruler ought
not to keep faith . . . when the reasons which made
him bind himself no longer exist".
Hume
"There is a maxim very current in the world, which few
politicians are willing to avow, but ....... authorised by the practice of all ages, that (the) system of morals calculated for princes, (offers) more free than that which ought to govern private persons."
Mackie acknlowledges that Hume does not argue that the treaties ought to have no force among princes- they serve similar purposes as agreements between individuals, and so are are similarly binding....but (Hume) less binding and may be lawfully be transgressed from more trivial motives. Why?
The Hume argument is that agreements between states are advantageous and necessary, but not so necessary nor advantageous as between individuals. Without agreements between individuals it would be impossible for society and the good life to exist. It was possible in Hume's time for the general citizenry of a country to still enjoy the good life even though their nation was in conflict with another. Armies fought - but must people (possibly the odd town or two) would be unaffected. They could go on subsisting. But is this conclusion true today? Hume would have it that
"we must necessarily give a greater indulgence to a prince or minister who deceives another, than to a private gentleman who breaks his word of honour".
Deceit may work in competitive games. But breaking solemn treaties corrupts the means of keeping conflicts (acceptable and inevitable in themselves) under tolerable control.
Agreements may end conflicts. International agreements may also be agreements to go to war. What if the British government promises Poland that if Germany attacks Poland then Britain will go to war with Germany? If Germany does attack, should the promise be kept?
Hard decisions are involved. Is it ever right to give categorical assurances? Consider the case of shaky assurances vs. steady, reliable of conduct.
Generally the practice of giving shaky assurances is likely to be worse than giving none at all or only those which will be kept (and it is openly known they will be kept), if the occasion arises. The premise is that unreliable promises are more likely to turn a conflict of interests into open war than either reliable promises or none at all.
Rivals may optimistically interpret shakey assurances from their own point of view (Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War) i.e. the USA will not go to war if I attack Kuwait. The rulers of Kuwait may however believe that the USA/NATO will do so. Kuwait princes are thus likely to take greater risks than normal in their dealings with Iraq, while those of Iraq will not be so restrained.
