MBS315 Mackie
8. Extensions of morality

Morality is concerned with the well-being of active, thinking people in a busy, competitive life. Moral constraints take the form of "necessary limits on competition for the benefit of all the competitors" i.e. consequentialism, rule-utilitarianism and forms of contracting.

Which non-participant groups offer morally valid claims - the foetus, children, the old, future generations, the aged, the sick/infirm/handicapped, the insane and animals?

Mackie stresses general "well-being ... the flourishing of human life" as the foundation of morality. He goes beyond consequences/actions to consider applications of rules, duties, rights, and dispositions to specific cases.

Upholding "human" ethical ideals requires safeguarding the well-being of the young and not spoiling the party for future generations. Being old is a life stage - the right to life doesn't end whilst life is flourishes albeit that there is physical decline. The sick or infirm become well. "Insanity" can be redefined and the sane may be thankful for this.

A contractual (insurance) approach supports those who may be powerless. The secure and provided for may be more willing to help the less privileged if "the contract" assures them that they will have rights and claims to consideration if an when they fall into a similar position.

But what are the moral claims of

  1. those who through severe handicap have never been and will in all probability never be independent active participants in the co-operative and competitive hurley-burley of everyday life?
  2. animals and other living things?

Neither are - themselves - in a bargaining position yet we are frequently dismayed at ill-treatment meted out to members of (A) and (B).

Mackie argues that extensions of the core moral case are needed beyond a general, local contract. With freer international relations and debate and given the scope for mutual help and harm, some moral principles may be extended to be applied globally between tribes, nations, races and religions etc.

But why if those in A or B groups can never deliberately help or harm us?

Humane disposition

...a key ingredient, seen in general sympathy with pain/suffering and hostility/disgust with cruelty. To be "spontaneously and uncalculatingly" the kind of people we need to be, we must be sympathetic not being callous and indifferent, actively cruel or impervious to less advantaged or obvious groups.

But animals are less close to us. The sympathy has a different quality. Few are infirm. Out on the plains of the Serengeti - life in the wild is tough. Animals ilive the food chain and struggle to survive. Most flourish in their own way.

The problem is that we associate animals empathetically with the human "good life". We transfer human regard for empathy to the hamster, wasp or rattlesnake. We watch Rolf Harris, vet-pet and Attenboro-esque TV programmes and sympathise with the harshness of animal.

Mostly we pull back from interfering which indeed may do more harm than good. We may seek to regulate the suffering that people do to animals directly , hunting, fishing or food or for sport; rearing (free range or factory farming) and experimenting with them for drugs and cosmetic testing.

Suffering caused indirectly through pollution has become a cause for concern. Factory farming practices are criticised for the harsh conditions animals are forced into. Is the suffering endured by some animals in scientific testing justified by the medical and safety benefits obtained by mankind?


The right to life
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This resource was prepared by Chris Jarvis for the BOLA project.