
Weber's rational, legal model of organisation is an important one for members and
stakeholders. They accept the purpose of the organisation as rational. The
authority of role relationships, the hierarchical structure of vertical and
horizontal links, the dependencies in duties, obligations and accountabilities
are logical. Authority is accepted/legitimised because the structures for
decision-making and action are defined with objective purpose.
However Weber modelled three forms of power giving rise to authority structures. Power vacuums and struggles for position result if these structures fail to provide a holding framework for members. The three forms are charismatic, traditional and rational-legal.
Traditional values and behaviours can be found in the modern world - the authority of the father in some families is an example.Those who are totally willing to dedicate themselves to a spiritual doctrine or ideology may adopt a very powerful position - an insular reality - which cuts across secular or scientific logic. Theirs is the one right way regardless of evidence to the contrary.
Well-established, modern business relies on the bureaucratic form - albeit constrained in what it can do by the bureaucratic regulation imposed by community legislators - for the community's benefit.
Roles, rights, duties and behaviour are guided by policies, rules, reporting regulations and controls, standard operating procedures, hierarchical and functionally specialised work structures.
Standardisation of methods and rules ensures that members of the organisation behave in predictable conformist ways and not personal whim. Their discretion is limited by the methods and rules that apply within the scope of their duties and responsibilities.
Divide and rule may minimise the influence of a large department or group. The efficacy of project teams (Harrison's task culture) set up to co-ordinate work across functional departments, would be significantly inhibited if project managers did not have the full co-operation of Heads of Departments. The latter could easilyset up rule-based and procedural barriers to matrix managers.
Many such rules were designed to control empoyees, ensure safety and protect employees, the public and the railway authorities. If a major accident occurred then clear regulations/rules define responsibilities and accountabilities. Yet paradoxically in, say, a railway organisation, zealous application of rules made over decades and not modified or rescinded means that few trains would leave on time. Work done to the letter and with all rules being inflexibly applied together can render a system inoperable. Normal working requires the application of individual discretion and interpretation of rules to the situation. The individual learns integration of rules not sequencing. The procedural aspects of a bureacracy become streamlined by the skills and competences of those carrying them out.
If there is a major accident, a public investigation frequently follows. Investigators compare actual events with norms of formal regulations - who is in error - and try to record deviations in practice, gaps in rules and where negligence has occured. The accident may be an act of god. Such a probability Perrow would argue is acknowledged by the system itself.
Rules and regulations are often created, invoked and used in proactive or retrospective ways as part of power play. They give potential power to both controllers and controlled. Controllers may try to "streamline" procedures and thus lock the relationships they seek to control. They are then in a position to use the rules to their advantage. These are important sources of organisational power. They define a contested terrain